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Limited Authorisations Between EU
and Domestic Law: Comparative Remarks
from Dutch Law
Johan WOLSWINKEL*, Frank VAN OMMEREN** & Willemien DEN OUDEN***
Where the number of authorizations available for grant is limited in advance to a maximum
number, public authorities have to make a choice between qualified applicants through a selection
procedure. EU law has played a major role in developing legal rules on the issuing of these
limited authorizations, through, amongst other methods, the development of the obligation of
transparency. However, the allocation regime under EU law, in particular as it arises from the
internal market freedoms, has some inherent restrictions, only applying to economic activities and
sometimes requiring cross-border interest in addition. Thus, in order to develop a general legal
regime that applies to any process for the issuing of limited authorizations, the development of an
allocation regime rooted in domestic law is necessary. This article discusses recent developments in
Dutch case law, where a domestic allocation regime has been derived from the (national) principle
of equal treatment. It endorses the adoption of this principle as the central basis for an allocation
regime, rooted either in domestic or in EU law, since this principle does not only include the key
issues inherent to an allocation context, but also allows for the development of allocation rules at
the level of both individual decision-making and general rule-making.
Keywords: administrative law, authorisations, allocation of scarce resources, equal
treatment, competition, transparency, general principles of administrative law, legal
comparison, EU law, internal market.
1 INTRODUCTION
Undoubtedly, EU law has played a major role in developing legal rules on ‘limited-
issued authorizations’1 or – in a shortened form – ‘limited authorizations’. Although
limited authorization schemes can be found in a wide range of policy areas, such as
gambling, public transport and telecommunications, all of these schemes share similar
characteristics: since the number of authorizations available for grant is limited to a
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1 This terminology is not yet common vocabulary in EU law. See for a scarce example thereof:
amendments 2 and 11 in the Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the award of concessions
contracts, O.J. 2012, C 391/49.
maximum number, public authorities need to make a selection between suitable
candidates for these authorizations. These common characteristics of limited author-
ization schemes give rise to general rules applicable to such processes.
EU law has shaped legal rules that are tailor-made for this so-called ‘allocation
context’, primarily under the umbrella of the internal market freedoms contained in
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) through the case-
law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and in secondary EU
legislation (e.g. the Services Directive2). Examples of these allocation rules are the
need for a separate justification of the applicable maximum number of authoriza-
tions, the obligation of transparency with its implication of a sufficient degree of
advertising, and the prohibition of an unlimited duration for limited authorizations.3
However, while EU law has fostered the development of general rules on limited
authorizations, the scope of this EU allocation regime is restricted. As far as the allocation
regime is based on the TFEU market freedoms, the starting point is the existence of an
economic activity with a (certain) cross-border interest. Admittedly, the requirement of
cross-border interest has very recently been relaxed under the Services Directive,4 but
this directive is not all-encompassingwhen regulating limited authorizations. TheTFEU
market freedoms and their inherent restrictions therefore remain relevant. Similarly,
some allocation issues that fall outside the domain of economic activities have not been
evaluated under the TFEU market freedoms, but under the general prohibition of
discrimination on grounds of nationality (Article 18 TFEU). The contours thereof,
however, are still far from crystallized as compared to the allocation rules flowing from
the TFEUmarket freedoms. Thus, in the process of identifying general rules applying to
any limited authorization scheme, EU law does not provide for an all-encompassing
framework. Consequently, there is a need for an approach complementary to an EU-
oriented approach. Such a complementary approach should depart from the experiences
in domestic jurisdictions with allocation issues falling outside the realm of EU law in
order to answer the questions of which allocation regime applies under domestic law and
whether this domestic allocation regime is, or should be, similar to that under EU law.5
2 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 Dec. 2006 on services
in the internal market, O.J. 2006, L 376/36.
3 See Johan Wolswinkel, From Public Contracts to Limited Authorisations and Vice Versa: Exploring the EU
Court’s Corollary Approach on Award Procedures, 24 Pub. Procurement L. Rev. 137, 145 (2015); Vassilis
Hatzopoulos, The Allocation of Limited Authorisations Under EU Internal Market Rules, in Scarcity and the
State I: The Allocation of Limited Rights by the Administration 163 (Paul Adriaanse, Frank van Ommeren,
Willemien den Ouden and Johan Wolswinkel eds, Intersentia 2016); Ferdinand Wollenschläger, EU
Law Principles for Allocating Scarce Goods and the Emergence of an Allocation Procedure. Identifying Substantive
and Procedural Standards and Developing a New Type of Administrative Procedure, 8 Rev. Eur. Admin. L.
205, 216–230 (2015).
4 Joined Cases C-360/15 and C-31/16, Visser Vastgoed, ECLI:EU:C:2018:44, para. 110.
5 See Wollenschläger, supra n. 3, at 253–254; and Paul Adriaanse, Frank van Ommeren, Willemien den
Ouden & Johan Wolswinkel, The Allocation of Limited Rights by the Administration: A Quest for a General
Legal Theory, in Adriaanse et al., supra n. 3, at 3–25.
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This article takes up this challenge and can be seen as a follow-up to the
introductory chapter in the book Scarcity and the State I: The Allocation of Limited
Rights by the Administration. That contribution ended with the following call:
It is clear that the lens provided by this scarcity perspective needs to be polished even
further. To that end, the comparative exercises on the allocation of limited rights, both
between areas of law and between Member States (as well as between Member States and
the EU), are worth continuing within legal academia. What is more, however, both the
legislature and the judiciary can play an important role in developing a general legal theory
on the allocation of limited rights that takes into account the peculiar characteristics of
these rights.6
When this paragraph was written at the end of 2015, it was unknown that the
highest administrative court of the Netherlands would very soon give a boost to
the development of such a domestic allocation regime. At the end of 2016, the
Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State (Afdeling bestuursrecht-
spraak van de Raad van State; hereinafter: Council of State) delivered a high-impact
judgment on limited authorizations by sketching the general contours of an
allocation regime that builds on the (national) principle of equal treatment instead
of EU law, although this regime is clearly inspired by EU law.7
The central question in this article is how a bottom-up approach to limited
authorizations, here defined as an approach where domestic law instead of EU
law develops and shapes the relevant allocation rules, could contribute to a
general theory on limited authorizations in administrative law.8 In addressing
this central question, this article adds to the existing literature in the following
way. Many (international) legal publications on limited authorizations have
adopted the EU-oriented top-down perspective, focussing on allocation rules
deriving from EU law, primarily the TFEU market freedoms.9 While attention
for the applicable allocation regime outside the realm of EU law is certainly not
absent in domestic public law scholarship,10 fewer attempts have been made to
6 Adriaanse et al., supra n. 5, at 25.
7 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 2 Nov. 2016, ECLI:NL:RVS:2016:2927
(Arcade Hall Vlaardingen).
8 For different modes of top-down and bottom-up approaches, see Adriaanse et al., supra n. 5, at 8, and
Wollenschläger, supra n. 3, at 253–254.
9 See amongst other contributions: C. J. Wolswinkel, The Allocation of a Limited Number of Authorisations;
Some General Requirements from European Law, 2 Rev. Eur. Admin. L. 61–104 (2009); M. Szydło, The
Process of Granting Exclusive Rights in the Light of Treaty Rules on Free Movement, 12 Ger. L.J. 1408
(2011); G. Skovgaard Ølykke, Is the Granting of Special and Exclusive Rights Subject to the Principles
Applicable to the Award of Concessions?, 23 Pub. Procurement L. Rev. 1, 6–7 (2014); Wolswinkel, supra
n. 3; Wollenschläger, supra n. 3; Johan Wolswinkel, Concession Meets Authorisation: New Demarcations
Lines Under the Concessions Directive?, 12 Eur. Procurement & Priv. P’ship L. Rev. 396–407 (2017), and
several contributions in Scarcity and the State I (Adriaanse et al., supra n. 3).
10 See e.g. in Germany, Ferdinand Wollenschläger, Verteilungsverfahren. Die staatliche Verteilung knapper
Güter: Verfassungs- und unionsrechtlicher Rahmen, Verfahren im Fachrecht, bereichsspezifische
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facilitate a comparison between these domestic allocation regimes (and the
overarching EU allocation regime). Only the legal comparison of allocation
regimes between different EU Member States and different sectors in Scarcity &
the State II11 reflects this bottom-up approach, but the topics covered in that
volume (emission allowances, radio frequencies, gambling licences) are all
covered to a greater or lesser extent by EU law.12 By discussing the recent
developments in Dutch administrative law, in particular the landmark judgment
Arcade Hall Vlaardingen (and its subsequent case law) for a non-domestic audi-
ence, we facilitate an international comparison of allocation regimes with the
aims of gaining knowledge, enriching and extending the ‘supply of solutions’
and of enabling the finding of a ‘better solution’ to a concrete allocation
problem in a certain jurisdiction.13 What is more, this contribution can also
feed the discussion on the relationship between domestic law and EU law in
allocation issues and thereby contribute to a further unification of allocation
rules and principles to be implemented by national legislatures.
This article is structured as follows. First, we show the need for a
complementary bottom-up or domestic law perspective to limited authoriza-
tion schemes by pointing out the achievements and restrictions of EU law
(section 2). Next, we describe the developments in Dutch administrative case-
law with regard to limited authorizations, culminating in the landmark judg-
ment Arcade Hall Vlaardingen, and sketch the impact of this judgment in
subsequent domestic case-law (section 3). On the basis thereof, we reflect on
the blurring distinction between allocation regimes based on either EU law or
domestic law. At the same time, the rise of allocation regimes in administrative
law gives cause for differentiation between the allocative task and other tasks
of the administration and the consequences thereof for administrative law
(section 4). We conclude this article with some observations on the next
steps to be made (section 5).
verwaltungsrechtliche Typen- und Systembildung (Mohr Siebeck 2010); in the Netherlands Johan
Wolswinkel, De verdeling van schaarse publiekrechtelijke rechten. Op zoek naar algemene regels van verdelings-
recht (Boom 2013); in Spain La administración de la escasez. Fundamentos de la actividad administrativa de
adjudicación de derechos limitados en número (L. Arroyo & D. Utrilla eds, Marcial Pons 2015), and in
France J. V. Maublanc, Le marché des autorisations administratives à objet économique (Université de Pau et
des Pays de l’Adour 2016).
11 Scarcity and the State II. Member State Reports on Gambling Licences, Radio Frequencies and CO2 Emission
Permits (Paul Adriaanse, Frank van Ommeren, Willemien den Ouden & Johan Wolswinkel eds,
Intersentia 2016).
12 The reason for selecting these three sectors has been the varying ‘degree of Europeanisation’ applicable
to these sectors. See Adriaanse et al., supra n. 11, at 5–6.
13 See on the merits of legal comparison in general, J. Schwarze, European Administrative Law 78–80
(Sweet & Maxwell 2006).
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2 TOP-DOWN AND BOTTOM-UP
2.1 THE HARVEST OF EU LAW: COMPETITION AND TRANSPARENCY
EU law has played a vital role in developing legal rules that are typically tailor-
made for the issuing of a limited number of authorizations. This is unsurprising,
since all efforts to realize a common market without internal frontiers have resulted
in an increased openness of national markets, including authorization schemes, to
economic operators from other Member States. Thus, while Member States have
always imposed restrictions to the number of authorizations available for grant, the
increased interest in acquiring limited authorizations by non-domestic operators is
relatively new.14 Once the number of interested economic operators exceeds the
number of authorizations available for grant, Member States have to make choices
between qualified applicants to award these limited authorizations.
An important achievement of EU law has been the development of the
obligation of transparency as an immediate corollary of the principle of equal
treatment.15 The Court introduced this obligation in 1996 in Commission v
Belgium with regard to the award of public contracts. In particular, it held that
the procedure for comparing tenders has to comply, at every stage, with both the
principle of equal treatment of tenderers and the principle of transparency so as to
afford equality of opportunity to all tenderers when formulating their tenders.
When a contracting entity takes into account an amendment to the initial tenders
of only one tenderer, it is clear that that tenderer enjoys an advantage over his
competitors, which breaches the principle of equal treatment of tenderers and
impairs the transparency of the procedure.16 In 2000, in Telaustria, the Court
extended the scope of this obligation to the award of (service) concessions, even
though these concession contracts were not subject to any EU secondary legisla-
tion at that time. It also further shaped the obligation of transparency by consider-
ing that this obligation consists in ensuring, for the benefit of any potential
tenderer, a degree of advertising sufficient to enable the services market to be
opened up to competition and the impartiality of procurement procedures to be
reviewed.17 In 2010, the Court ruled in Sporting Exchange that this obligation of
transparency also applied to the grant of exclusive authorizations, since this obliga-
tion is a mandatory prior condition of the right of a Member State to award to an
14 For example, the Dutch monopoly on organizing sports-related games of chances had already existed
from 1961 onwards, but was not contested in court before 2004, when Betfair, a betting company
established in the United Kingdom, tried to obtain access to the Dutch gambling market (Case C-203/
08, Sporting Exchange, ECLI:EU:C:2010:307, paras 12 and 15).
15 Into more detail on this principle, see A Buijze, The Principle of Transparency in EU Law (Boxpress
2013).
16 Case C-87/94, Commission v. Belgium, ECLI:EU:C:1996:161, paras 54 and 56.
17 Case C-324/98, Telaustria, ECLI:EU:C:2000:669, paras 60–62.
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operator the exclusive right to carry on an economic activity.18 In the context of
exclusive authorization schemes, compliance with the principle of equal treatment
and with the consequent obligation of transparency means specifically that the
objective criteria enabling the Member States’ competent authorities’ discretion to
be circumscribed must be sufficiently advertised.19
It would be incorrect, however, to restrict the impact of EU law only to the
obligation of transparency. Instead, where the obligation of transparency is ulti-
mately a corollary of the TFEU market freedoms, these freedoms, in particular, the
freedom of establishment (Article 49 TFEU) and the free movement of services
(Article 56 TFEU), have given rise to other allocation rules. For example, the
Court has made it clear that a limitation of the number of authorizations and the
award of such limited authorizations for unlimited duration constitute prohibited
restrictions to free movement, unless such restrictions are objectively justified and
proportionate, i.e. unless such restrictions are justified by an overriding reason
relating to the public interest and are both suitable and necessary with regard to
that reason.20
Whereas sector-specific EU legislation had already addressed the issuing of
limited authorizations from the 1990s onwards,21 the adoption of the Services
Directive in 2006 marked a new chapter in the development of allocation rules.
Because of its trans-sectoral scope, the Services Directive provides for some general
rules on limited authorizations. In particular, Article 12 deals with selection from
among several candidates in cases where the number of service authorizations is
limited because of the scarcity of available natural resources or technical capacity.22
In those cases of limited authorization schemes arising as a result of natural or
technical limitations of capacity (hereafter referred to as ‘naturally’ occurring
limitations), public authorities must apply a selection procedure to potential
candidates which provides full guarantees of impartiality and transparency,
18 Sporting Exchange, supra n. 14, paras 46–47.
19 Sporting Exchange, supra n. 14, para. 51.
20 See e.g. Case C-64/08, Engelmann, ECLI:EU:C:2010:506, para. 43, distinguishing three different
restrictions. Into more detail, see Wolswinkel (2009), supra n. 9; Wolswinkel, supra n. 3; and
Wollenschläger, supra n. 3, distinguishing between substantive and procedural aspects.
21 Examples include the Hydrocarbons directive (Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 30 May 1994 on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the
prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons, O.J. 1994, L 164/3), the Authorisation
Directive (Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 Mar. 2002 on
the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services, O.J. 2002, L 108/21 and its
predecessor Directive 97/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 Apr. 1997 on a
common framework for general authorisations and individual licences in the field of telecommunica-
tions services, O.J. 1997, L 117/15). Into more detail on this sector-specific EU legislation, see Johan
Wolswinkel, The Need for Optimal Choice. Exploring a Hierarchy Between Allocation Procedures for Limited
Authorisations Under EU Law, in Adriaanse et al. (2016), supra n. 3, at 195–205.
22 Into more detail, see Wolswinkel, supra n. 11, at 90–94. An example of such naturally limited
authorizations is the authorization to store mineral resources in emptied gas fields.
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including, in particular, adequate publicity about the launch, conduct and comple-
tion of the procedure.23 Since Article 12 provides for exhaustive harmonization,24
this provision has replaced Article 49 TFEU as the relevant legal framework for
‘naturally’ limited authorization schemes, at least as far as establishment of service
providers is concerned.25 The resulting allocation rule contained in Article 12
Services Directive is stricter than the rule flowing from Article 49 TFEU: the
wording of Article 12 Services Directive does not allow for any exception to the
obligation of adequate publicity,26 while exhaustive harmonization no longer
permits a claim to this exception being based on Article 49 TFEU.27 For other
‘artificially’ limited authorization schemes, a provision similar to Article 12 is
lacking in the Services Directive. Therefore, as confirmed by the Court in
Promoimpresa, the award of such artificially limited authorizations is still subject to
the obligation of transparency flowing from Article 49 TFEU, which – at least
theoretically – still allows for objective justification in case of a lack of prior
advertising.28
In addition to the requirement of an impartial and transparent selection
procedure, the Services Directive contains relevant provisions on the duration of
limited authorizations. As far as naturally limited authorizations are concerned,
such an authorization must be granted for an appropriate limited period and may
not be open to automatic renewal, nor confer any other advantage on the service
provider whose authorization has just expired or on any person having any
particular links with that service provider.29 With regard to artificially limited
authorizations, Article 11 stipulates that the authorization granted to a service
provider shall not be for a limited period, except where the number of available
authorizations is limited by an overriding reason relating to the public interest. In
Trijber and Harmsen, the Court has interpreted this provision such as to exclude
authorization for unlimited duration: no discretion may be conceded to the
competent national authorities, without undermining the objective pursued by
Article 11 of securing service providers’ access to the market in question.30 Thus,
irrespective of whether the number of authorizations is limited for natural or
artificial reasons, the duration of these authorizations should be limited.
23 Art. 12(1) Services Directive. The same link between transparency and impartiality had already been
emphasized by the Court in Telaustria, supra n. 17, para. 61.
24 Joined Cases C-458/14 and C-67/15, Promoimpresa, ECLI:EU:C:2016:558, para. 61.
25 Art. 12 Services Directive is part of Ch. III on the establishment of services providers, thereby leaving
free movement of services (Art. 56 TFEU) untouched.
26 Promoimpresa, supra n. 24, paras 54–55.
27 Promoimpresa, supra n. 24, para. 62.
28 Promoimpresa, supra n. 24, paras 70–71. See also Wolswinkel, supra. n. 9, at 9–10.
29 Art. 12(2) Services Directive.
30 Joined Cases C-340/14 and C-341/14, Trijber and Harmsen, ECLI:EU:C:2015:641, paras 62–63.
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2.2 RESTRICTIONS TO THE EU ALLOCATION REGIME
It is fair to conclude that a market-freedom based allocation regime31 has emerged
under EU law, even though not all allocation rules have yet been crystallized.
Nonetheless, the scope of this allocation regime is traditionally limited by two
important restrictions: the need for an economic activity and the existence of
(certain) cross-border interest.
Firstly, the TFEU market freedoms presuppose the exercise of an economic
activity. Although the wording of the market freedoms in the TFEU does not
refer to ‘economic activity’ as such, this overarching concept underlies all market
freedoms. This is clear from Article 4 Services Directive, which defines a ‘service’
as any self-employed economic activity, normally provided for remuneration, as
referred to in Article 57 TFEU.32 Although the concept of an economic activity
has been interpreted as any activity consisting in offering goods and services on a
given market,33 this broad interpretation does not cover every activity that is
subject to an authorization scheme. To some extent, this has been confirmed
recently in Visser Vastgoed, where the Court held that the Service Directive does
not apply to State requirements that do not regulate or do not specifically affect
the taking up or the pursuit of a service activity, but have to be respected by
providers in the course of carrying out their economic activity in the same way as
by individuals acting in their private capacity.34 In the words of Advocate
General Szpunar, not every requirement that might have the most incidental
effect on the freedom of establishment is a market freedom restriction that needs
to be justified.35 Consequently, such ‘general’ requirements, applying both to
service providers and other citizens, do not come within the scope of the Services
Directive. Considering (limited) authorization schemes in particular, this may
hold, e.g. for mooring authorization schemes or parking permit schemes: the
activity of mooring a vessel or parking a car can be exercised equally both by
service providers and by (other) individuals.
31 For this terminology, see Wollenschläger, supra n. 3, at 210.
32 See also Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar of 18 May 2017 in Joined Cases C-360/15 and C-31/
16, Visser Vastgoed, ECLI:EU:C:2017:397, para. 68.
33 See among other judgments: Case 118/85, Commission v. Italy, ECLI:EU:C:1987:283, para. 7; Case C-
35/96, Commission v. Italy, ECLI:EU:C:1998:303, para. 36; Case C-237/04, Enirisorse, ECLI:EU:
C:2006:197, para. 29.
34 Visser Vastgoed, supra n. 4, para. 123.
35 Opinion Advocate General Szpunar, supra n. 32, para. 136. See also recital 9 of the Services Directive:
‘This Directive applies only to requirements which affect the access to, or the exercise of, a service
activity. Therefore, it does not apply to requirements, […] which do not specifically regulate or
specifically affect the service activity but have to be respected by providers in the course of carrying out
their economic activity in the same way as by individuals acting in their private capacity’.
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Secondly, the TFEU market freedoms, which are rooted in the principle of
non-discrimination on grounds of nationality (Article 18 TFEU),36 presuppose
cross-border interest. According to settled case law, the provisions of the TFEU on
the freedom of establishment, the freedom to provide services and the free move-
ment of capital do not apply to a situation which is confined in all respects within
the borders of a single Member State.37 In Ullens de Schooten, the Court clarified
that it is nonetheless willing to interpret provisions of the Treaties relating to the
fundamental freedoms, on the ground that it is not inconceivable that nationals
established in other Member States had been or were interested in making use of
those freedoms for carrying on activities in the territory of the home Member
State, and, consequently, that the legislation, applicable without distinction to
nationals of that State and those of other Member States, was capable of producing
effects which were not confined to that home Member State.38 Yet, though the
Court has expressed its willingness to interpret the TFEU market freedoms in
those circumstances, this does not imply that a domestic service provider can rely
on these freedoms (and the resulting allocation regime) before its national court.39
Whether a domestic service provider can invoke the TFEU market freedoms
successfully, is an issue to be determined by domestic law.
2.3 GRADUAL EXPANSION OF THE EU ALLOCATION REGIME?
Notwithstanding the two important restrictions of economic activity and cross-
border interest, the EU allocation regime is gradually gaining ground. First, the
Court has also evaluated the granting of ‘limited rights’ that do not come within
the scope of the market freedoms.40 In Bressol, for example, the Court considered
capacity restrictions for foreign students to higher education in Belgium. It con-
sidered that students have the right, enshrined in Articles 18 and 21 TFEU, to
move and reside freely within the territory of a Member State, without being
subject to direct or indirect discrimination on ground of their nationality. One
particular consequence of this prohibition of discrimination is that Articles 18 and
21 TFEU preclude national legislation which limits the number of non-resident
students in Belgium who may enrol for the first time in medical and paramedical
36 Case C-458/03, Parking Brixen, ECLI:EU:C:2005:605, para. 47; Case C-91/08, Wall, ECLI:EU:
C:2010:182, para. 32.
37 See Case C-268/15, Ullens de Schooten, ECLI:EU:C:2016:874, para. 47, with reference to previous
case-law.
38 Ullens de Schooten, supra n. 37, para. 50, with reference to Joined Cases C-570/07 and C-571/07,
Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez, ECLI:EU:C:2010:300, para. 40.
39 Wollenschläger, supra n. 3, at 211–215.
40 See also Wolswinkel, supra n. 3, at 158, and Wollenschläger 2015, supra n. 3, at 230–231, on ‘allocation
beyond the market’.
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courses, unless that legislation is justified in light of the objective of protection of
public health. In particular, according to the Court, a selection process for non-
resident students by the drawing of lots, which is based not on the aptitude of the
candidates concerned but on chance, should be necessary to attain the objectives
pursued.41 Although the obligation of transparency has not played a vital role
under Article 18 TFEU until now, it cannot be excluded that this EU ‘allocation
beyond the market’ regime will also encompass that obligation, since the Articles
49 and 56 TFEU are considered specific expressions of the prohibition of dis-
crimination on grounds of nationality (Article 18 TFEU).42
When it comes to the other requirement of cross-border interest, the scope of
the EU allocation regime has not always been limited to cross-border situations. As
noted above, the Court has recently confirmed in Ullens de Schooten that the TFEU
market freedoms do not apply to a situation which is confined in all respects within
a single Member State. Nonetheless, when applying the obligation of transparency,
the Court seems a little more generous to domestic undertakings which invoke the
TFEU market freedoms. In Belgacom, the Court held that once it has been
established that there is a certain cross-border interest, the obligation of transpar-
ency to be complied with by the concession-granting authority benefits any
potential tenderer, even where it is established in the same Member State as that
authority.43 Consequently, an economic operator in a Member State may allege an
infringement of the obligation of transparency under Articles 49 and 56 TFEU
occurring at the time of conclusion of an agreement whereby one or more public
entities of that Member State have either granted to an economic operator of that
same Member State a licence for services of certain cross-border interest or granted
an economic operator the exclusive right to engage in an economic activity of
cross-border interest.44 Although this judgment seems hard to reconcile with the
cross-border requirement that is inherent to the TFEU market freedoms (and may
even be outdated after Ullens de Schooten),45 its immediate effect is the exclusion of
reverse discrimination: given the existence of certain cross-border interest, the
TFEU market freedoms also confer rights to domestic service providers in as far as
the obligation of transparency is concerned. By contrast, where a limited author-
ization lacks (sufficient) cross-border interest, the TFEU market-based allocation
41 Case C-73/08, Bressol et al., ECLI:EU:C:2010:181, paras 81–82.
42 Wall, supra n. 36, para. 32.
43 Case C-221/12, Belgacom, ECLI:EU:C:2013:736, para. 32. See also Parking Brixen, supra n. 36, para.
48: ‘the principle of equal treatment of tenderers is to be applied to public service concessions even in
the absence of discrimination on grounds of nationality’. In Parking Brixen, the Court did not consider
the case as purely internal, since undertakings established in other Member States might have been
interested in providing the services concerned (Parking Brixen, supra n. 36, para. 55).
44 See Belgacom, supra n. 43, para. 34.
45 See with further references for criticism to this approach: Wollenschläger, supra n. 3, at 214.
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regime does not apply, unless national legislation has made applicable the provi-
sions of EU law to purely internal situations.46
When considering the EU allocation regime resulting from the Services
Directive, the need for a cross-border interest is completely absent. In its recent
judgment in Visser Vastgoed, the Court finally put beyond doubt that the provisions
of Chapter III of the Services Directive on establishment of service providers
(Articles 9 to 15) apply also to purely internal situations without requiring any
cross-border interest.47 As an immediate consequence of this judgment, the alloca-
tion regime flowing from Articles 11 and 12 Services Directive does also apply to
purely domestic allocations.
The foregoing shows that although EU allocation regimes are definitely
gaining ground, some allocations are still not (fully) within the scope of EU law.
For these ‘residual’ allocations, it is a matter of domestic law which allocation
regime applies: an allocation regime inspired by EU law or another allocation
regime.
3 CASE-STUDY: LIMITED AUTHORIZATIONS IN THE
NETHERLANDS
3.1 A TRADITION OF LIMITED AUTHORIZATIONS
For several reasons, Dutch law is an interesting candidate for exploring the
contours of an allocation regime for limited authorizations from a domestic law
perspective, independent of the EU market-based allocation regime.
First of all, Dutch law has a long-standing tradition whereby the issuing of
authorizations belongs to the domain of public law, whereas the conclusion of
concession contracts is situated within the domain of private law.48 In Sporting
Exchange, the Dutch government therefore argued that the obligation of transpar-
ency cannot be extended to a licensing system which starts with an administrative
authorization instead of a contract.49 In response, the Court did not deny the
difference between authorizations and concession contracts, but ruled that this
difference does not, in itself, justify any failure to have regard to the requirements
arising from Article 56 TFEU, in particular the principle of equal treatment and
the obligation of transparency, when granting an administrative authorization.50 In
46 Ullens de Schooten, supra n. 37, para. 53.
47 Visser Vastgoed, supra n. 4, para. 110.
48 Gerdy Jurgens & Frank van Ommeren, The Public-Private Divide in English and Dutch Law: A
Multifunctional and Context-Dependent Divide, 71 Cambridge L.J. 172, 183 (2012).
49 Opinion of Advocate General Bot of 17 Dec. 2009 in Cases C-203/08 and C-258/08, Ladbrokes and
Sporting Exchange, ECLI:EU:C:2009:791, para. 149.
50 Sporting Exchange, supra n. 14, para. 46.
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other words, the obligation of transparency does also apply to the granting of
exclusive authorizations. In Promoimpresa, an Italian case on so-called concessioni for
tourist beach activities, the Dutch government pointed out that the term ‘conces-
sion’ is often used to refer to an exclusive right or an authorization, but that does
not mean that every ‘concession’ is a concession as defined by EU public procure-
ment law.51 In response to the Commission’s draft for a Concessions Directive, the
Dutch government adopted a similar position, arguing that a separate Concessions
Directive was not necessary, as such concession contracts hardly occur in the
Netherlands, and that authorization schemes, which are more common in the
Netherlands, should remain outside the scope of the Concessions Directive.52
Interestingly, the Committee of the Regions adopted a similar opinion,
which – surprisingly or not – had been prepared by a Dutch rapporteur.53 This
opinion on the Concessions Directive did not only emphasize that licences,
including operating licences issued in limited quantities (referred to as ‘limited-
issued licences’), must remain outside the scope of the directive, but even proposed
an amendment to put beyond doubt that these ‘limited-issued licences’ should not
qualify as concessions.54 These examples illustrate that the Dutch government has
always been hesitant to apply the EU allocation regime to limited authorizations.
In addition, when implementing the Services Directive with its allocation-
oriented provisions, the Dutch government circumvented the issue of whether this
directive, at least the chapter about the freedom of establishment and authorization
schemes, also applied to purely internal situations.55 Thus, in the absence of an
explicit obligation in national legislation to apply the Services Directive voluntarily
to purely internal situations, it waited for the Court’s interpretation of the Services
Directive on the question of whether its provisions should also be applied to purely
internal situations, an issue that was not settled before early 2018.56 This uncer-
tainty about the exact scope of the EU allocation regime might have been an
additional reason for Dutch administrative courts to further develop an allocation
regime rooted in domestic law.
51 See the Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar of 25 Feb. 2016 in Joined Cases C-458/14 and C-67/
15, Promoimpresa, ECLI:EU:C:2016:122, para. 61.
52 See Kamerstukken II [Parliamentary Papers II] 2011/12, file number 22 112, nr. 1344.
53 Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the award of concessions contracts, O.J. 2012, C 391/
49.
54 See policy recommendation 10 and amendment 2 of this opinion (supra n. 52). See also Promoimpresa,
supra n. 24, paras 44–45.
55 S. Prechal, S. de Vries & F. van Doorn, The Implementation of the Services Directive in The Netherlands, in
The Implementation of the EU Services Directive, Transposition, Problems and Strategies 441 (U. Stelkens, W.
Weiß & M Mirschberger eds, T.M.C. Asser Press 2012).
56 See the cases Trijber and Harmsen, supra n. 30, and Visser Vastgoed, supra n. 4.
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3.2 CONTOURS OF A NATIONAL ALLOCATION REGIME
Although the award of limited authorizations has been contested before Dutch
courts for many decades,57 Dutch legal doctrine has addressed the issue of the legal
regime applicable to those awards of limited authorizations mainly in the
last decade.58 Some of these limited authorizations are clearly shaped by EU law,
e.g. radio spectrum licences, but other limited authorizations have less common
ground with EU law. One example of those licences that have less common
ground with EU law, is the municipal licence to operate an arcade hall offering
games of chance (hereinafter: arcade hall licence): although the economic activity
of offering games of chance is within the scope of the EU fundamental freedoms,
which is also confirmed by Dutch case-law,59 such gambling licences may lack
cross-border interest, as might be the case with municipal arcade hall licences. In
those circumstances, the EU market freedoms cannot be invoked. In addition,
domestic legislation on these limited authorizations is more than once rather
‘silent’: national or municipal legislation sets a limitation to the number of author-
izations available for grant, but detailed rules on the award of these limited
authorizations are usually lacking. Thus, in the absence of a sector-specific alloca-
tion regime, administrative courts need to adopt a more deductive approach on the
allocation regime, deriving concrete allocation rules from general principles of
administrative law.
Initially, the highest Dutch administrative court with regard to economic
affairs, the Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry (College van Beroep
voor het bedrijfsleven), was the leading actor in the development of rules on limited
authorizations based on general principles of administrative law. An illustrative
example is a judgment from 2009, where it derived an obligation to offer compe-
tition opportunities for limited authorizations from the principle of diligence (due
care), which requires administrative decisions to be prepared and taken carefully.
The scope of this case law derived allocation rule was initially limited to the
57 For example, in the 1980s, case-law indicated already that in the event of mutually exclusive
applications, a (very global) comparison between applicants was necessary (Wolswinkel (2013), supra
n. 10, at 62).
58 See inter alia F. J. van Ommeren, Schaarse vergunningen. De verdeling van schaarse vergunningen als onderdeel
van het algemeen bestuursrecht (Kluwer 2004); Schaarse publieke rechten (F. J. van Ommeren, W. den
Ouden & C. J. Wolswinkel eds, Boom Juridische uitgevers 2011); Wolswinkel (2013), supra n. 10; A.
Drahmann, Transparante en eerlijke verdeling van schaarse besluiten (Kluwer 2015); J. van Rijn van
Alkemade, Effectieve rechtsbescherming bij de verdeling van schaarse publieke rechten (Boom 2016).
59 Apart from the Betfair case, which resulted in the Sporting Exchange judgment of the Court, reference
can be made to the case of Schindler, a gambling operator from Germany, where the Council of State
held that against the background of the case law of the Court of Justice regarding the free provision of
services, the proportionality requirement of suitability and necessity was not satisfied as ‘no procure-
ment had occurred at all’ (Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 18 July 2007,
ECLI:NL:RVS:2007:BA9831).
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particular circumstance where there is no possibility for a new licence to be
granted without an existing licence expiring or being revoked. In that particular
circumstance, where all available licences have already been granted, other market
parties should in principle be given the chance to compete for a new licence that
becomes available.60 Since then, this specific obligation to create opportunities for
competition has been gradually extended, initially to other candidates who had
already expressed their interest in obtaining a limited authorization,61 and then to
any potential candidate for limited authorizations.62 In particular, case law clarified
that this requirement to create competition opportunities implies that it should be
clear to potential applicants whether the licence is, or will be, available and which
allocation procedure will be followed.63
In addition to the principle of diligence, the Administrative High Court
for Trade and Industry also relied on the (unwritten) principle of legal certainty
and the principle of proportionality. According to this court, ‘high standards’
should be imposed on the allocation procedure from the perspective of legal
certainty.64 To some extent, this reference to legal certainty ran the risk of
becoming an empty phrase, since legal certainty did not often return in the
judgments of the Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry when con-
crete allocation rules were formulated. One exception was the prohibition derived
from the principle of legal certainty to switch to another allocation mechanism,
once a specific allocation mechanism has been chosen and potential candidates
have acted on the basis thereof.65 With respect to the duration of limited author-
izations, the Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry ruled that a
prohibition to grant limited authorizations for an indefinite period could be
disproportionate to new entrants who had expressed their interest in obtaining
the authorization.66 Although this case law of the Administrative High Court for
60 Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry 3 June 2009, ECLI:NL:CBB:2009:BI6466 (Arcade
Hall The Hague).
61 Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry 15 May 2012, ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BW6630
(Sunday evening shop Wassenaar).
62 Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry 24 Augustus 2012, ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BX6540
(Sunday evening shop Castricum).
63 Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry 28 Apr. 2010, ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BM4375
(Arcade Hall Zwolle).
64 See e.g. Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry 8 Jan. 2010, ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BL3125
(Sunday evening shop Heemstede) and Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry 24 Augustus
2012, ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BX6540 (Sunday evening shop Castricum).
65 Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry 8 Jan. 2010, ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BL3125 (Sunday
evening shop Heemstede).
66 See e.g. Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry 15 May 2012, ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:
BW6630 (Sunday evening shop Wassenaar) and Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry 24
Augustus 2012, ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BX6540 (Sunday evening shop Castricum).
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Trade and Industry, in cases outside the scope of EU law, shows some resemblance
to EU allocation regimes, no explicit reference was made to Union law.
3.3 A TURNING POINT? ARCADE HALL VLAARDINGEN
Early 2016, the president of the highest general administrative court in the
Netherlands, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State,
requested its Advocate General to submit an opinion on the question of whether
there is any legal norm under domestic law requiring administrative authorities to
offer competition opportunities to potential applicants for limited authorizations.
According to the Dutch General Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuurs-
recht), such an opinion can be requested for the sake of legal uniformity and legal
development.67 Legal uniformity was at stake here, since both the Council of State
and the Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry were confronted with
cases on limited authorizations, but hardly cross-referenced each other’s judgments.
What is more, specific allocation rules had been developed ad hoc on a case-by-
case basis with different underlying general principles of administrative law,
thereby underlining the need for a coherent allocation regime from the perspective
of legal development. The circumstance that such an opinion of an Advocate
General is requested only a few times a year, underlines the importance of this issue
in administrative law.
In his opinion,68 Advocate General Widdershoven gave a detailed overview of
both EU and domestic legislation, case law and literature. On that basis, he
concluded that Dutch law contains a legal norm requiring administrative autho-
rities to create opportunity for potential applicants to compete for the available
licences. In its subsequent judgment, the Council of State69 agreed with the
Advocate General and derived a general allocation regime from the principle of
equality. This principle, according to the Council of State, should be interpreted in
this allocation context as requiring equal opportunities to be offered.70 It formu-
lated three specific allocation rules within this allocation regime. First, there is a
legal obligation for public authorities to create competition opportunities for
potential applicants. Secondly, limited authorizations can, in principle, only be
granted temporarily to avoid giving licensees a disproportionate advantage and
67 Art. 8:12a General Administrative Law Act.
68 Opinion Advocate-General Widdershoven 25 May 2016, ECLI:NL:RVS:2016:1421 (Arcade Hall
Vlaardingen).
69 One of the five judges in the grand chamber of the Council of State was the president of the
Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry. This indicates that the judgment intended to
contribute to consistency between case law of the Council of State and the Administrative High Court
for Trade and Industry.
70 Arcade Hall Vlaardingen, supra n. 7.
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depriving newcomers of the possibility of entering the market. Finally, in order to
ensure equal opportunities, public authorities should ensure a sufficient degree of
advertising regarding the availability of the licence, the allocation procedure, the
application period and the applicable criteria. Timely before the start of the
application procedure, the authorities should provide clarity on this procedure by
disclosing information on these aspects through a medium which enables potential
applicants to take notice thereof. The lack of a sufficient degree of advertising
amounts to a breach of the principle of equal treatment and the consequent
obligation of transparency.71
The Council of State did not only put beyond doubt the existence of an
obligation to create opportunities for competition, but also made clear that this
obligation is not absolute. According to the Council of State, a legitimate restric-
tion of this obligation can result from either legislation with respect to the limited
authorization scheme itself or other legislation that applies to the exercise of the
activity at stake. An example of the latter restriction could be spatial planning
legislation: the limited possibility to grant an operating licence that is required to
commence an economic activity can be restricted by the requirement that this
exploitation should be in conformity with a zoning plan. The Council of State
added that such a restriction cannot go as far as to entirely exclude any competition
opportunities. In any case, legislation itself or its legislative history should make
clear that the interest of creating competition has been weighed against other
interests.
Three years later, this judgment Arcade Hall Vlaardingen has become the new
legal standard to evaluate allocations of limited authorizations, especially in the case
law of the Council of State. Moreover, subsequent case law shows that the new
allocation regime of the Council of State is not a completed construction, but is
still ‘work in progress’, both in substance and in scope.
As for substance, for example, the Council of State has added to the previously
mentioned allocation rules the requirement that the criteria should be formulated
clearly, precisely and unambiguously.72 This means that the criteria should provide
for sufficient guidance to potential candidates when submitting their application.
Alongside the introduction of new allocation rules, existing allocation rules have
been refined. For example, with regard to exceptions to the allocation rule of
requiring that limited authorizations should be of a limited duration, the Council
of State has held that these exceptions are difficult to conceive of in the case of
71 Arcade Hall Vlaardingen, supra n. 7, para. 12.
72 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 27 Sept. 2017, ECLI:NL:RVS:2017:2611
(Arcade Hall Helmond).
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authorizations for economic activities,73 whereas in the case of limited authoriza-
tions for non-economic activities, such exceptions can be justified in particular
circumstances by the principle of legal certainty.74 Another example of refinement
is the relaxation of the requirement of limited duration if the limited authorisation
concerns the activity of constructing a building: because of the temporary nature of
this activity, there is no need to artificially limit the duration of this authorisation.75
The scope of the domestic allocation regime has been gradually expanded.
Even though the Council of State merely referred to limited authorizations in
Arcade Hall Vlaardingen, it has also applied its allocation regime to the funding of
secondary school education, because the applicable legislation provides for a system
of regulated competition between secondary schools,76 and to financial subsidies
that are available in limited amount.77 Early 2018, Advocate General
Widdershoven was asked to submit an opinion on limited rights in spatial planning
law. He concluded that a zoning plan that assigns different functions to different
locations does not involve the allocation of limited rights. In addition, an indivi-
dual permit to deviate from such a zoning plan (a so-called ‘zoning permit’) is, as a
rule, not a decision involving the allocation of limited rights, since, as a rule, there
is only one possible applicant for such a permit, namely the person who disposes of
the location for which the permit is applied. In particular circumstances, however,
such a zoning permit is a limited authorization, such that its issuing is subject to the
domestic allocation regime. This occurs, for example, if there is a ‘close connec-
tion’ between the zoning permit and an operating licence that is available in
limited quantity: if the operating licence can only be granted in conformity with
the zoning plan, whereas the zoning plan does only allow for the grant of one
zoning permit for the establishment of an arcade hall, both authorization proce-
dures need to be coordinated, such that the principle of equal treatment and the
obligation of transparency are complied with in both procedures.78 In its subse-
quent judgment in Wind Farm Zeewolde, however, the Council of State did not
make clear whether it underlined this opinion or not. Instead, it merely ruled that
73 Cf. para. 182 of the opinion of Advocate General Bot of 17 Dec. 2009 in Cases C-203/08 and C-258/
08, Ladbrokes and Sporting Exchange, ECLI:EU:C:2009:791.
74 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 12 Apr. 2017, ECLI:NL:RVS:2017:994
(Authorisation Doorn).
75 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 30 Aug. 2017, ECLI:NL:RVS:2017:2331
(Wind Farm Noord-Holland).
76 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 18 Jan. 2017, ECLI:NL:RVS:2017:86.
77 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 11 July 2018, ECLI:NL:RVS:2018:2310.
78 Opinion Advocate General Widdershoven 6 June 2018, ECLI:NL:RVS:2018:1847 (Wind Farm
Zeewolde). See already in the case-law of the Council of State: Arcade Hall Helmond, supra n. 72. On
this issue, see also C. J. Wolswinkel, Economic Law Meets Environmental Law. New Expansion of the
Services Directive?, in Upgrading Trade and Services in EU and International Economic Law 41–61 (S. Tans et
al. eds, Wolf Legal Publishers 2019).
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limited rights were not at stake in this particular case.79 Thus, it is still an open
question to what extent the domestic allocation regime also applies to decisions in
spatial planning law.
3.4 COMPARATIVE REMARKS: EXPLORING THE SCOPE OF THE NATIONAL ALLOCATION
REGIME
From a comparative point of view, these recent developments in Dutch law with
regard to limited authorizations give rise to several observations.
First, the (new) Dutch allocation regime is principle-based: allocation rules are
not derived by analogy from sector-specific legislation in fields where the alloca-
tion of limited rights is regulated more intensely, e.g. telecommunications law or
public procurement law. Although the resulting allocation rules are similar to the
rules in these densely regulated fields, this case law regime does not refer explicitly
to the general prevalence of these allocation rules in other fields.
Secondly, the Council of State has adopted the principle of equal treatment as
the central legal basis for its allocation regime, in both its substantial and its
procedural manifestation. This is a discontinuity with existing case law of the
High Administrative Court on Trade and Industry, which adopted other general
principles of administrative law, such as the principles of diligence (due care), legal
certainty and proportionality, as legal basis for its allocation regime.
Thirdly, when adopting the principle of equal treatment as legal basis, the
Council of State did not refer to the Dutch Constitution, which starts with the
recognition of the principle of equal treatment as a fundamental right.80 Instead,
the allocation regime is based on the unwritten principle of equal treatment as a
general principle of administrative law. Thus, the inductive approach adopted by
the Council of State does not coincide with a constitutional approach, deriving
allocation rules directly from the Constitution.81 The explanation, therefore, might
be a lack of constitutionalization in Dutch administrative law.82
Fourthly, the Council of State acknowledges the idiosyncrasies of limited
authorizations by concretizing the general principle of equal treatment into a
context-dependent principle of ‘equal opportunities’. Since equal outcomes cannot
be achieved because of the limitation to the number of available authorizations,
79 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 19 Dec. 2018, ECLI:NL:RVS:2018:4198
(Wind Farm Zeewolde).
80 Art. 1 of the Dutch Constitution.
81 See L. A. Jiménez & D. Utrilla, The Allocation of Limited Public Rights: An Analytical and Constitutional
Approach, in Adriaanse et al., supra n. 3, at 35.
82 E. A. Alkema, Constitutional Law, in Introduction to Dutch Law 333–334 (4th ed., J. Chorus, P.-H.
Gerver & E. Hondius eds, Kluwer Law International 2006).
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equal treatment can only be realized in the form of equal opportunities to compete
for those limited authorizations.
An immediate consequence of the choice for a general principle of adminis-
trative law that applies across all areas of administrative law, is that there is no
reason in advance to restrict the scope of the allocation regime to limited author-
izations only. Thus, it is not surprising that the scope of the allocation regime has
been gradually expanded to limited rights in general (including financial grants),
irrespective of whether economic or non-economic activities are at stake. This
triggers the question of the relationship between this domestic allocation regime
and the EU allocation regime with its inherent restrictions to economic activities
with cross-border interest.
In comparison with EU law, three additional observations are to be made.
First, although the Council of State did not refer to EU law in Arcade Hall
Vlaardingen, a subsequent judgment clarified that the third allocation rule, requiring
a sufficient degree of advertising, was based on the obligation of transparency in the
Court’s case law. By this explicit reference, the Council of State tried to bridge the
gap between domestic and EU allocation regimes, but still left some unclarity: does
the Council of State adopt the EU obligation of transparency voluntarily in areas or
cases where EU law does not apply or does the Council of State use this obligation
of transparency merely as a source of inspiration?
Secondly, the Council of State did not frame the domestic allocation regime as
a residual regime in the sense that it should only apply if the EU allocation regime
does not apply. Instead, the Council of State seemed to introduce an allocation
regime that applies irrespective of whether or not the limited authorization at stake
has (certain) cross-border interest. Thus, the issue whether there is cross-border
interest or whether secondary EU legislation, such as the Services Directive, applies
to purely internal situations, can be circumvented by applying this domestic
allocation regime. In the particular case of Arcade Hall Vlaardingen, the Council
of State therefore concluded that there was no need to discuss the appeal grounds
relating to a breach of Union law after observing that the award at stake did not
comply with the principles of equal treatment and the obligation of transparency as
interpreted in the domestic allocation regime. However, in as far as it is clear that
the EU allocation regime applies, the Council of State is still willing to apply this
regime, either the Services Directive83 or the TFEU provisions.84 What is more,
after the Court’s judgment in Visser Vastgoed, the Council of State has already
applied its EU allocation regime in purely internal situations without having
83 See e.g. Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 7 June 2017, ECLI:NL:
RVS:2017:1520 (canal tour operating licence Amsterdam).
84 See e.g. Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 2 May 2018, ECLI:NL:
RVS:2018:1466 (lotto).
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recourse to its own domestic allocation regime.85 Conversely, the Council of State
has been willing to apply its domestic allocation regime if an applicant could not
invoke the TFEU fundamental freedoms because of a lack of cross-border interest
in the particular case.86 Thus, both allocation regimes seem to be used
interchangeably.
The third and final pressing issue is whether the application of both allocation
regimes yields the same outcome. At first sight, the allocation rules that are part of
the domestic allocation regime (obligation to create competition opportunities,
limited duration, sufficient degree of advertising) seem to coincide with the EU
allocation regime, if not exactly in wording, then at least in essence. However, the
content and scope of exceptions to these general allocation rules might differ under
EU and domestic law. In that regard, it is noteworthy that the exception clause
formulated by the Council of State does not refer to concrete exceptions familiar in
EU law, such as extreme urgency or the circumstance that only one specific
operator is able to exercise the activity at stake. Instead, the Council of States
prescribes in more abstract terms the need to balance in advance the interest of
facilitating competition versus other interests, e.g. the obligation to respect legal
certainty.
4 TOWARDS A GENERAL ALLOCATION REGIME?
4.1 ORIENTATION TOWARDS EU LAW?
The Dutch case-law discussed above gives rise to the more general question of
how a bottom-up approach to limited authorizations or – more generally – limited
rights, understood as an allocation regime rooted in domestic law, should develop
and, in that context, should relate to the top-down perspective of EU law.
Insofar as economic activities are concerned, an explicit orientation in domestic
law towards EU law seems not only useful, but even indispensable. This is self-
evident for economic activities with a cross-border effect, since that effect deter-
mines the applicability of the market freedoms of the TFEU. However, the Services
Directive turns out to be an EU allocation regime that is increasingly gaining
ground, not only across services, but also in purely internal situations and with
regard to activities concerning retail trade of goods. Given this tendency of ongoing
expansion, existing exceptions, either in scope (e.g. gambling activities) or in sub-
stance (e.g. exceptions to transparency), might be captured by the Services Directive
in the near future. Taking the allocation regime of the Services Directive, which
85 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 16 Mar. 2018, ECLI:NL:RVS:2018:902.
86 Wind Farm Noord-Holland, supra n. 75.
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builds on the Court’s case law on the TFEU market freedoms, as the EU point of
reference, such a coordinated approach can create consistency between purely
internal and cross-border situations. In as far as limited authorizations with certain
cross-border effect fall outside the scope of the Services Directive, applying the same
EU allocation regime has the advantage of excluding reverse discrimination to the
disadvantage of domestic economic operators, if this reverse discrimination has not
already been excluded in advance by EU law.87
The orientation in the Dutch allocation regime towards EU law authoriza-
tions can be categorized as a very light version of voluntary adoption. In Ullens de
Schooten, the Court referred to a situation where national law requires the national
court to grant the same rights to a national of its own Member State as those which
a national of another Member State in the same situation would derive from EU
law.88 In a specific allocation context, this would mean that if a limited authoriza-
tion outside the scope of the Services Directive has certain cross-border effect, then
domestic service providers could rely on the EU allocation regime of the TFEU
market freedoms as well. Although the Council of State has not stated explicitly
that it aims to grant the same rights to domestic service providers as to foreign
service providers, this is the actual outcome of the judge-made allocation regime.
That judicial law-making approach contrasts with the cautious approach adopted
by the Dutch legislator, who has been hesitant to extend the scope of relevant
allocation provisions of EU law, e.g. in the Services Directive, to situations
confined in all respects within the Netherlands. What is more, the Dutch legislator
has still been quite absent in this process of developing a domestic allocation
regime with a minimum set of legal rules.89
In sum, as far as economic activities are concerned, pragmatic reasons such as
the ongoing expansion of the Services Directive and the prevention of reverse
discrimination of domestic service providers, justify an explicit orientation towards
EU law in those cases where EU law does not apply directly. Outside the scope of
economic activities, other, more fundamental considerations come to the fore.
In our view, before addressing the question of which allocation regime applies
(domestic or EU law), it is necessary to identify those characteristics of limited
authorizations that are shared across all sectors. Following this conceptual or
analytical approach towards limited authorizations,90 limited authorizations are
characterized foremost by the existence of a limitation to the number of rights
(authorizations) available for grant. Without such a maximum, limited
87 See e.g. Belgacom, supra n. 43.
88 Cf. Ullens de Schooten, supra n. 37, para. 52.
89 See Frank van Ommeren (2016), Challenges for the National Legislator: The Allocation of Limited Rights by
the Administration, in Adriaanse et al, supra n. 3, at 73–91.
90 Adriaanse et al., supra n. 5, at 9–15.
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authorizations do not occur. The existence of this maximum opens up the
possibility that the number of available authorizations will not be sufficient to
satisfy all (potential) applicants. In those circumstances of scarcity, public authorities
have to choose, selecting which applicants obtain a right and which do not. In this
selection procedure, applicants that qualify for the authorizations at stake equally,
need to be treated differently. Because of the impossibility of realizing equal
outcomes, the highest attainable value is ensuring equal opportunities in the
selection procedure for applications competing for these limited authorizations.91
This conceptual characterization of issuing limited authorizations illustrates
that equality is at stake here.92 Thus, the principle of equal treatment appears to be
the most natural candidate among the general principles of administrative law as a
legal basis for allocation regimes. Even though other legal principles, such as the
principal of legal certainty, could also be relevant for developing an allocation
regime, the principle of equal treatment exhibits the peculiarities of allocation
issues more distinctively. In fact, the general principle of equal treatment could
even constitute the legal basis of some ius commune on allocation issues across
Member States, provided this principle is given a context-dependent meaning.
Thus, in our view, any approach to allocation issues that puts central the
principle of equal treatment, either in EU or in domestic law, should be
welcomed.93 In general, this principle requires that comparable situations must
not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the
same way, unless such treatment is objectively justified.94 In other words, such a
difference in treatment should not be the result of discrimination on arbitrary
grounds. From the perspective of EU law in general and EU internal market law in
particular, discrimination on grounds of nationality is most problematic, as it
favours domestic service providers at the expense of foreign service providers.
However, from a more general perspective, any distinction that cannot be justified
objectively, either on grounds of nationality or on other grounds, amounts to
arbitrary discrimination.
To some extent, the EU allocation regime does already reflect a shift from the
specific prohibition of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality to the general
principle of equal treatment. Considering the principle of discrimination on
91 See Wolswinkel, supra n. 3, at 147.
92 Some authors have even argued that equality or non-discrimination has relevance in cases of scarcity
only. See B. P. Sloot, Positieve discriminatie. Maatschappelijke ongelijkheid en rechtsontwikkeling in de
Verenigde Staten en in Nederland [Positive discrimination. Societal inequality and legal development in
the United States and in the Netherlands] 26 (W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink 1986), and to some extent
C. Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument 36 (Humanities Press 1977).
93 See e.g. the judgment of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht on university admissions (BVerfG,
Judgment of the First Senate of 19 Dec. 2017, ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2017:ls20171219.1bvl000314).
94 Case C-127/07, Arcelor, ECLI:EU:C:2008:728, para. 23.
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grounds of nationality merely as a specific expression of the principle of equal
treatment,95 the Court proclaims equal opportunities for any service provider once
a certain cross-border interest has been settled96 or simply because some EU
legislation, e.g. the Services Directive, applies to purely internal situations equally.
Consequently, the obligation of transparency applies, even in the absence of
discrimination on grounds of nationality. Equally, under the TFEU market free-
doms, unlimited duration of limited authorizations is considered to be a restriction
to free movement for foreign service providers. The Services Directive, however,
also puts forward the distinction between incumbents and new entrants. Although
this distinction might coincide initially with the distinction between domestic and
foreign service providers, this one-to-one correspondence blurs over time once
foreign service providers have succeeded in obtaining limited authorizations after
an impartial and transparent selection procedure.
It is submitted that every allocation regime rooted in the principle of
equal treatment will be roughly similar because of the identical characteristics
of allocation issues across sectors and jurisdictions. In particular, it should not
be surprising that EU law and domestic law provide for a similar allocation
regime. In this respect, it is noteworthy that, when implementing Article 12 of
the Services Directive, some Member States chose for a one-to-one transposi-
tion of the wording of Article 12, whereas other Member States refrained from
a separate implementation of this provision, since the allocation principles
enshrined in this provision were considered to be already part of national
law.97
At the same time, the recognition that the resulting allocation regime will
be roughly similar, does not imply that the application of both principles will
coincide completely. For example, the chosen medium to satisfy the require-
ment of a sufficient degree of advertising can differ for limited authorizations
with and without a cross-border interest. Next, justified exceptions to general
allocation rules on competition opportunities and limited durations can also
differ between EU and domestic allocation regimes. However, the explanation
for these differences should no longer be found in the particularities of an
allocation context, since this context is conceptually identical irrespective of
whether the domestic or the EU regime applies. Likewise, the justification for
differences should no longer be found in a different understanding of the
principle of equality, as this principle should be given the same meaning at
95 Parking Brixen, supra n. 36, para. 48.
96 Belgacom, supra n. 43, para. 32.
97 The Implementation of the EU Services Directive, Transposition, Problems and Strategies 32–33 (U. Stelkens,
W. Weiß & M. Mirschberger eds, T.M.C. Asser Press 2012).
LIMITED AUTHORISATIONS BETWEEN EU AND DOMESTIC LAW 581
both the EU and the domestic level, requiring equal opportunities to be
ensured and implying concrete rules on limited duration and sufficient adver-
tising. Instead, any difference in application should be explained by the
different weight that is given to the principle of equality vis-à-vis other
legitimate interests. Whereas in EU law the objective of protecting and
promoting an internal market appears to be a weighty interest that cannot be
easily outweighed by other interests,98 the relative weight of this principle of
equality vis-à-vis other interests can be different at the domestic level,99
thereby allowing for more exceptions to an equality-based allocation regime
in domestic law.
4.2 ALLOCATION ISSUES AS CATALYST FOR GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The foregoing shows the advantages of developing a general legal regime on
the allocation of limited rights on the basis of the principle of equal treatment.
What is necessary, therefore, is an interpretation of this principle that takes
into account the specific allocation context, shifting from equal outcomes to
equal opportunities. This context-dependent interpretation of the principle of
equal treatment can be considered a further emancipation of general adminis-
trative law, fostered by developments in sector-specific areas of administrative
law.100
Instead of emphasizing the distinction between national and EU allocation
regimes, the principle of equal treatment should be embraced as the underlying
basis for some ius commune on allocation issues. A context-dependent interpretation
of this principle encourages further analysis of the differences between the alloca-
tive task and other tasks of the administration, e.g. ensuring minimum levels of
quality for citizens, and of the consequences of this distinction for the application
of general principles of administrative law and for the design of administrative
procedure.101 Wollenschläger has described this context-dependent approach as
the need for task-related ‘type formation’ in administrative law. Such type forma-
tion acts as an intermediary between the concretion of sector-specific legislation
98 This difference in application of general principles of law is not unique, as the application of the EU
principle of legitimate expectations is also stricter than the domestic principle of legitimate expecta-
tions. See J. E. van den Brink & W. den Ouden, General Principles of Law, in Europeanisation of Public
Law 207–235 (J. H. Jans, S. Prechal & R. J. G. M. Widdershoven eds, Europa Law Publishing 2015).
99 See also Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law 6 (Oxford University Press 2006).
100 See on this ‘emancipation’ of general administrative law: F. Wollenschläger (2015), Constitutionalisation
and Deconstitutionalisation of Administrative Law in View of Europeanisation and Emancipation, 10 Rev. Eur.
Admin. L. 7, 65 (2017).
101 See also C. J. Wolswinkel, Limited Public Rights and Beyond. An Allocation Perspective to Public Law, Law
& Method (2015), and Adriaanse et al., supra n. 5, at 7.
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and the abstraction of general administrative law, and hence takes place at a
‘medium level of dogmatic system formation’. This approach permits sector-
specific provisions to be reflected in an abstracting manner without running the
risk, because of too high a level of abstraction, of losing sight of the structures and
challenges that are characteristic of the specific field.102
The recent case law of the Dutch Council of State does not only show the
need for, but also the merits of this exercise of type formation. In particular,
the domestic allocation regime discussed in section 3 adopts a context-depen-
dent interpretation of the principle of equal treatment, requiring equal oppor-
tunities to be ensured. The allocation rules that result from this subprinciple of
equal opportunities, turn out to be stricter than general rules of administrative
law on the grant of (non-limited) authorizations. For example, the requirement
of a sufficient degree of advertising obliges administrative authorities to make
sufficient information publicly available in advance, i.e. before the start of the
application period. By contrast, in the absence of a limitation to the number of
available authorizations, any applicant who satisfies the granting criteria could
be granted an authorization. Consequently, the need for ex ante publication of
information would be less urgent. What is more, the allocation rule on the
duration of a limited authorization can even be considered an allocation rule
deviating from general administrative law. Whereas unlimited duration is the
starting point for non-limited authorizations because of the administrative
burdens for the holder of the authorization to request for renewal, at least
according to EU law,103 the allocation rule that limited authorizations shall not
be granted for unlimited duration, constitutes an exception to this starting
point.
To some extent, the bottom-up approach towards limited authorizations that
is rooted in domestic law opens up even more possibilities to develop a general
legal theory on the allocation of limited rights than a top-down approach inspired
by EU law. In particular, the Dutch allocation regime has already been applied to
other limited rights than authorizations for economic activities, such as subsidies
and certain permits in spatial planning law. Whereas these limited rights still share
the characteristics of being granted at request, the recent debate on the issuing of
limited rights assigned in a spatial zoning plan calls for considering the allocative
102 Wollenschläger (2015), supra n. 3, at 252, with reference to R. Wahl, Vereinheitlichung oder bereichsspe-
zifisches Verwaltungsverfahrensrecht?, in Die Vereinheitlichung des Verwaltungsverfahrensrechts 42–50
(W. Blümel ed., Duncker & Humblot 1984), and E. Schmidt-Aßmann, Der Verfahrensgedanke im
deutschen und europäischen Verwaltungsrecht, in Grundlagen des Verwaltungsrecht. Band II:
Informationsordnung, Verwaltungsverfahren, Handlungsformen 536 (W. Hoffmann-Riem & E. Schmidt-
Aßmann & A. Voßkuhle eds, C.H. Beck 2012), referring to ‘Verteilungsverfahren’ (allocative
administration) as one of these types of administrative action.
103 Art. 11 Services Directive.
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task of the administration at the level of general rule-making next to individual
decision-making. This means that the consequences of a context-dependent inter-
pretation of the principle of equal treatment and the corollary obligation of
transparency need to be made explicit at the level of general rule-making as
well. For example, is there an obligation to create equal opportunities for compe-
tition in the context of the general decision-making process of a zoning plan for
some municipal area and, if so, how should these opportunities for competition be
created effectively?
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The allocation of scarce resources is a task at the very heart of public administra-
tion. The awareness that this allocative task of the administration gives rise to a
separate legal regime with distinct allocation rules has gradually gained ground,
both in EU and in domestic law.
This article contributes to this process of maturation of allocation regimes by
adopting a bottom-up approach towards limited authorizations, hence primarily
focussing on the role of domestic law instead of EU law. Although EU law has
undoubtedly played a significant role in recognizing and developing legal rules that
are tailor-made for an allocation context, the resulting EU allocation regime has
some inherent limitations as it mainly builds on the TFEU market freedoms. Thus,
it applies to economic activities with a certain cross-border interest only, unless
secondary legislation, such as the Services Directive, transposes this regime to
purely internal situations as well.
Recent case law of the Dutch Council of State shows the merits of a
context-dependent interpretation of the principle of equal treatment, shifting
from equal outcomes to equal opportunities. The resulting allocation regime
exhibits the mutual relationships between several allocation rules, e.g. on the
duty to create opportunities for competition and the prohibition of unlimited
duration, and strengthens the need for transparency ex ante without reducing
the allocation regime to issues of transparency only. What is more, because of
its explicit orientation towards EU law, it facilitates a comparison between
allocation regimes under EU and domestic law. This does not mean that
domestic allocation regimes should be considered subordinate to EU law,
although in the light of Ullens de Schooten, the Court might be willing to
interpret its EU market-based allocation regime for the purposes of applying
this regime in a domestic context. Instead, irrespective of its orientation
towards EU law and irrespective of whether economic activities are at stake,
such a domestic allocation regime should be applied consistently and continu-
ously in order to fulfil its guiding and unifying role. Conversely, since the
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domestic allocation regime is derived from general principles of administrative
law also embraced by EU law, developments in domestic case-law might also
provide guidance for the Court in translating the general principle of equal
treatment into a specific allocation context. Thus, this contribution should also
be regarded as an invitation to other legal scholars to disclose the allocation
regime applicable in their Member States, such that legal comparison between
domestic allocation regimes can result in further identification of some ius
commune in administrative law as far as the allocative task of the administration
is concerned.
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